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Abstract
Social security system old age insurance systems are devices for the sharing of income risks
of elderly people with others.  Risks can be shared intergenerationally (with the young of the
same country), intragenerationally (with other elderly of the same country) or internationally
(with foreigners).
Barriers to individuals themselves sharing their risks intergenerationally, intragen-
erationally or internationally are described.  Optimal design of government-sponsored social
security systems is considered in light of these barriers.
Alternative benefits and contributions formulas for pay-as-you-go social security systems
are defined and compared with existing and proposed formulas in terms of their ability to
fulfill the government’s role in promoting risk sharing.  Benefits for each retired person may
be tied to that person’s lifetime income without causing (as with the US benefits formula
today) aggregate benefits for all elderly today to be tied to their past aggregate income.
Keywords:  Old age insurance, pensions, risk management, hedging, theory, elderly,
investments, pay-as-you-go, Social Security Trust Fund, overlapping generations model.
JEL number:  H55
This paper was prepared for the Carnegie–Rochester Public Policy Conference, April 24–25,
1998.
1Of course, social security reform can have important purposes beyond that of fulfilling the risk
management function better.  Some authors (Feldstein, 1996; Feldstein and Samwick, 1997) have
argued that there are striking benefits to encouraging saving as might be done by forcing people to
invest their social security contributions, see also Mitchell and Moore (1997).  Social security incen-
tives may offset distortions already created by our tax system.  Reforms of social security might reduce
labor market distortions resulting in a higher level of labor input to production, Kotlikoff (1996).
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1.  Introduction
The central function of social security old age insurance is risk management, the manage-
ment of the risk that some random turn of events will leave elderly people impoverished.
The words “security” and “insurance” are there in the names of these programs to make this
risk-management function clear.  While social security also serves other important purposes,
to force some people to save for retirement who might not have the intelligence or self
control to do so on their own, and to alter the wealth distribution of society, the risk
management function for the elderly is still the central defining function of the system.1
Some of the other functions of social security old age insurance can be handled by other
programs, programs to encourage saving, general welfare programs, and progressive income
taxes.
Risk management means, of course, risk sharing.  The function of insurance is to allow
people to escape risks that are concentrated on them and share these risks over large num-
bers of people.  Management of risks does not make the risks disappear, instead they are
spread over many people so that their effects are less painful.  A theory of social security
old age insurance therefore must be a theory of the sharing of risks, and we must have at the
foundation of this theory an understanding of who takes on the risk formerly borne by the
elderly, and how this spreading of risks is ultimately achieved.  With such a theory, we will
know whether any old age insurance proposal is genuinely insurance, and not just something
that sounds superficially like insurance.  We must also know why it is that we should
consider the elderly as a group for special insurance needs consideration, and we must
understand why there is a legitimate role for the government in the providing of such
insurance.
With risk management its central function, it would appear that the theoretical issues
involved in social security design are fundamentally in the realm of theoretical finance.  In
this paper, I will try to adapt some lessons from theoretical finance to understanding issues
of social security design.  And yet the problem of designing social security systems raises
issues that are fundamentally different from the risk management issues that have dominated
most of the literature on theoretical finance.  The finance literature generally presumes that
the fundamental theoretical problem is the individual’s problem of optimizing a portfolio
of investment assets.  But, in designing social security, the fundamental problem is the
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government’s problem of deciding on institutions on behalf of individuals, some of whom
are currently capable of taking actions to manage their risks and some of whom are not.
These institutions must promote the management of risks not only among people who are
currently actively managing their own risks but also among people who are still minors or
not even yet born, and also many adults today who are, because of limits on their financial
management ability, or limits of existing financial institutions, not capable of fully managing
their own risks.
The problem of optimal design of social security old age insurance systems also differs
from the characteristic problem of theoretical finance in that it need not take as given the
individual wealth positions or the investment and hedging vehicles that are available.  The
nature of the problem is that the government can create any tax of wealth or create any
investment hedging institution.  The problem of design of social security systems is thus
more comprehensive, fundamental and open to major initiative than is the problem of indi-
vidual optimal portfolio management.  It is true that public discussion of reform of social
security system in the US has often taken the form of discussing little more than whether the
Social Security Trust Fund should invest in US stocks as well as bonds, but the limited
nature of this discussion is probably due to the limited ability of immediate national political
debate to comprehend the variety of alternatives that are possible.  If we assume that the
focus of public debate in this country can be shifted eventually, or that the state of public
debate in other countries may not face the constraints that we have here, then we will not
want to take such a narrow perspective on the options for social security system design.
The assumption I will make is that social security old age insurance systems are to be
designed with the a social welfare function that gives weight to the risks of all people alive
in the country today as well as to all subsequent generations.  Individuals can be assumed
to manage their own individual risks, with varying degrees of success and sophistication,
and, also, with varying dates of birth and thus varying time horizons within which they may
take actions to manage risks.  Thus, the design of a social security system is inherently a
problem of defining rules of the game so that limited individual risk management will
promote social welfare.
There are three major groups with which elderly income risks can be shared:  risks can
be shared with the young people in the same country, with other elderly people in the same
country, and with people in other countries.  The existence of these three groups who might
bear individual risk of the elderly motivate the title of this paper:  there is the possibility of
intergenerational, intragenerational, and international sharing of the risks of the elderly.
In the theoretical literature on social security in economics journals, the intergener-
ational risk sharing has naturally garnered the most attention.  If the elderly should have low
income, then the young will step forward to help them.  This form of risk sharing is the most
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natural to think of, since it is a national embodiment of ancient family traditions and
obligations.  In the absence of strong and predictable family bonds, it is impossible for the
elderly to procure such risk sharing in free markets, since they cannot deal when they are
young with the unborn (who will be young adults when they are old) and so there is a
fundamental role for the government in securing this risk sharing.
Intragenerational risk sharing, despite the relatively meager theoretical attention given
to it, also appears to be a very important motivation for social security as we see it.  Some
elderly will by chance have higher income than others, and they can pool this risk among
themselves.  The intragenerational risk sharing may seem to have a less secure footing in
giving a role for government intervention, since people could in principle secure such risk
sharing for themselves, by diversifying and hedging.  In fact, however, there are various
reasons why the government has a legitimate role in creating intragenerational risk sharing.
The government can take on management of risks that are revealed before the people are old
enough to make risk management contracts, can promote risksharing for which institutions
do not exist, and take on the management of risks for individuals who are not competent to
manage their own affairs fully.
International risk sharing also tends to be overlooked in discussions of social security.
Individuals, in deciding on their own risk management procedures, are operating in a global
economy where they may share, using existing markets, risks with others alive at the same
time, even in other countries.  When governments in individual countries also create social
security systems that permit risk sharing across generations in the country, then inherently
there is an option of sharing risks between individuals in one country with unborn indi-
viduals (as well as minors and individuals incapable of managing their own affairs) of
another country, even though there are no institutions to allow them to do this directly.
They can share risks with unborn individuals in another country by trading with other people
who are alive because of the intergenerational risk management devices created by social
security systems within individual countries.
In this paper I will take a few sequential steps towards understanding better the inter-
generational, intragenerational, and international risk-sharing functions that governments
have in designing social security systems.  Before doing this, I will give first a brief dis-
cussion of the nature of the unfunded pension liability as a “transition cost,” since the
problem of this unfunded liability is often confused with the real risk management issues.
I will then present some simple models in which the government will be seen as setting the
rules according to which individuals optimize, but at the same time doing this with concern
for the broader social welfare situation.  One point that will emerge from this discussion is
that the optimal social security system should define benefits in such a way that people are
allowed to consume a share of national income available for generations alive at the same
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time.  Actual and proposed social security systems usually do not do this national income
sharing at all right.  For example, a proposal to have people invest their social security
contributions in individual accounts invested in the stock market, and to be entitled only to
their portfolio outcomes, is just a nonstarter as a national risk-management institution for
the elderly.  It is not insurance at all.  In the conclusion, I will consider what recommenda-
tions for reform of social security seem to emerge from this analysis, at least tentatively.
I will suggest a benefits rule for a social security system that is ultimately a risk-sharing
scheme, and then ask how various proposed social security reforms measure up in terms of
this optimal risk management.  I will discuss the proposals to the US Congress of the
1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security from the standpoint of risk management,
proposals which alter the risks to the Social Security System by investing in stocks, but
proposals that did not stress how they will fulfil the insurance function better or to whom
the risks are spread.
At various points in this paper I will make reference to a proposal I have made in my
1993 book Macro Markets:  Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest Economic
Risks, that markets should be created to allow trading of claims in shares of national in-
comes or other important income aggregates.  These markets would resemble stock markets,
except that the shares would be shares in countries (or other aggregations) rather than
companies, and the dividends paid would be shares of these incomes.  The markets might
also take the form of markets for government debt indexed to national income.  The macro
markets would be vastly bigger, in terms of underlying value available to trade, than the
stock markets we have today.  I make references to these macro markets in this paper since
these markets would be fundamentally involved with the very risk management problem that
is central to the social security system design problem, and because the potential of these
markets for improved risk management is great.  The creation of the international macro
markets might even solve most of the risk-management problem that social security is
designed to deal with, and produce a greater welfare improvement than would the optimum
social security system without these markets.  However, I recognize that while there is an
impetus now for social security reform, these macro markets are still rather far from
acceptance, and so I will try to bracket these discussions.  The analysis of social security
reform offered here is intended to offer insights into the issues that we face today.
2. A Preliminary on Investment Opportunities and
Unfunded Pension Liabilities
Much of the recent discussion of replacing a pay-as-you-go social security system with a
fully or partially funded one, where the contributors social security contributions are
2At this point of history in the U.S., we should probably  assume that the expected return on the U.S.
stock market is in fact lower than the historical average return, see Campbell and Shiller (1998).
Siegel (1998) also argues that with higher market valuations today we cannot expect continuation of
these earlier returns.
3The US Social Security Trust Fund in 1996 contained $424 billion; the 1997 income was $447
billion, 1997 outlays were $395 billion.
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invested in high yielding investments such as stocks, is motivated by the concern that social
security participants are being cheated out of the possibility of earning higher returns on
their contributions.  The participants may look regretfully at how much they would have
earned if they had invested their social security contributions in the stock market, and
wonder why the government should be constraining them to make what appears to be a very
bad investment.  It is important for us first to consider this point of view, since it seems to
involve some confusion of the important issues of risk management that are before us.
The most obvious point to make is that the returns in the stock market observed recently
should not be assumed to continue indefinitely.  The regret felt by social security contribu-
tors may be particularly poignant at this point of history, where the US stock market has
been climbing almost continually since 1982, and has made stunning gains in the past few
years.  But we should base our analysis not on the extraordinary returns earned by the stock
market in recent years, but instead by the normal expected return that it earns.2
A point that is less obvious to the general public is that there is another cause to the low
returns that is conceptually distinct from any issues of optimal design of social risk manage-
ment institutions.  This cause is the burden of the unfunded pension liability.
A substantial reason that the return on their social security contributions is so low
relative to other expected returns available is that the participants are not being allowed to
invest their contributions in stocks, bonds, or anything else.  They are not being allowed to
do this because, in effect, they are paying for the gift that was made to the first generation
of social security participants, who received much more in benefits than they put in.  That
there was such a gift in the US is plain, since the Social Security Trust Fund today, after
sixty years of receiving contributions from participants, amounts to only a little over one
year’s contributions, essentially the rest having been disbursed, in the pay-as-you-go
operations, to beneficiaries.3  The Social Security System has obligations to pay future
retirees for every year that they live in retirement, but has the funds to pay for only about
one such year.
Why was such a large gift made to the first generation to benefit from social security?
In the United States, the initial designers of the Social Security System in 1935 had
envisioned the building of a large trust fund.  The 1939 amendments and subsequent
changes prevented this from happening.  While there was recognition at the time that a gift
6
was being made to early beneficiaries, there was confusion on whether this gift would
represent a burden to subsequent generations, see Miron and Weil (1998).  Optimism about
economic growth would mean that the initial burden may be later swamped out by higher
standards of living.  Blinder argues that the initial gift in the US was viewed as com-
pensation for the suffering imposed by the Great Depression of the 1930s.  However, similar
gifts to first generations have been made in many other countries at different times, and
countries with less exposure to the Great Depression, see World Bank (1994).  In some
countries (e.g., Ecuador) the gift was made gradually, as the coverage of the system across
the population was broadened in steps.  An explanation that so many countries have made
gifts to early generations may lie instead in political realities; voters may see the immediate
benefits without understanding the ultimate costs.  Unfunded pension liabilities may have
helped boost government’s perceived value to the electorate just as unfunded pension
liabilities have in the past helped boost individual companies values by disguising the nature
of their debt from the market.  It may take a long time before the public thoroughly learns
to see through such accounting tricks.
That gift made already has still to be paid for by someone.  (See Stiglitz, 1983, for an
elaboration of this discussion.)  There is no escaping that, and as presently constituted the
largely pay-as-you-go social security system has each subsequent generation paying in the
form of lower returns on their social security contributions than they could get if they
invested them on their own behalf.
Let us consider a simple two-period overlapping generations model in which there is no
population growth and no economic growth, a model that we will be used throughout this
paper for its simplicity.  In this simple model, there are always two generations alive at any
given time, a young working generation and an old retired generation, there are always the
same number of people in each generation, and we will stylize the social security system so
that it has no trust fund at all, is strictly  pay-as-you-go.  Time is measured in units of
generations.  When the social security system is first set up, the first generation receives
benefits B as a gift, not having made any contributions, the gift equal to the contribution B
of the then young, which are just transferred to them immediately (pay as you go).  One
generation later, the formerly young, now old, are paid back B, by a transfer of the
contributions from the new young, in an amount equal to their contributions, and so on with
each subsequent generation.  Since each generation pays B when they are young and
receives B back again a generation later, they are in effect earning zero interest on their
contribution.  If the interest rate (or return on a portfolio of investments) measured in time
units of a generation is r, then each subsequent generation loses, in effect, the interest rB
they would have earned on their contribution had they invested it at interest.  The present
value of the infinite stream of costs rB, rB, rB, ... discounted at interest rate r is of course
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just B.  Under this pay-as-you-go security system, every generation after the first is burdened
by the obligation in amount B, the unfunded pension liability, and each generation pays the
interest on this and passes the obligation on to the next generation, so that the obligation is
never changed.
The nation faces the fundamental problem that we cannot just switch to a fully funded
social security system, allowing participants to invest their money in stocks or anything else,
without finding a way to come up with the money, B, to pay existing social security
obligations to retired persons.  It is remarkable that this simple and fundamental point is
overlooked so much in public discourse about social security.  Many commentators with
political agendas seem to have an impulse to ignore this problem, even though the key
motivating factor for their discussions appears to be really just the burden B, magnified at
present because the baby boom puts the burden even more heavily on the young today than
the static-population model above implies.
Given that the pay-as-you-go social security system represents a sort of debt to older
people, one might take the view that there is nothing to be done about it.  We should just
continue to follow such a system, though some of its characteristics could be reformed.  If
a consequence of this system is that people are not saving enough, the system can always
be augmented with savings incentives.  We can also hope that the original designers of the
system were right that economic growth will continue to make the initial burden less severe.
This problem of the inherited unfunded pension liability B does sometimes appear in
public discussions, and then it is typically referred to as a “transition cost” to moving to a
fully-funded system.  As such, it is misnamed.  It is not a cost of transition, not a cost of
changing the system.  The existing pension obligations are merely a form of national debt.
The burden B, for the US Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) system, has
been estimated to amount to about 9 trillion dollars, although its exact value is ambiguous
since the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) formula does not clearly specify what would be
owed on the basis of past contributions if the social security system were changed from this
date forward.  (See Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes, 1998.)
An alternative to the present system that seems often to be suggested is that there should
be a transition period towards a fully funded system, a period during which either the current
old are receiving less than their contracted benefits, to allow the current young to invest
some of their contribution, or a period during which the current young are paying more than
the usual amount, so that they can both support the current old and also make investments
for themselves, or some combination of these two.  This would mean that the cost would be
borne disproportionately by social security participants, apportioned according to their
social security benefits or incomes, who are alive during the transition period.
There appears to be no reason why the transition cost should be visited
4They project that the extra 1.52% payroll tax would still result in a shortfall of meeting existing
obligations between 2000 and 2034, and excess revenues thereafter, and that “the shortfall would be
met by issuing bonds to the public for the next 40 years (totaling an estimated 1.9 trillion in 2034, in
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disproportionately in this way on the social security benefits or incomes of social security
participants who are alive at certain times.  The costs of the policy of granting a gift to the
first generation to receive benefits without contributing could be borne across all income
levels in a more equitable manner, by transferring the obligation to pay existing social
security obligations officially to the national debt, the federal government assuming the
social security system obligations to be paid from general tax revenues, and allowing
subsequent generations or social security participants to invest their contributions and enjoy
the proceeds.  Unfortunately, such a solution is politically difficult, since it would require
acknowledging that our national debt is (when existing social security liabilities are in-
cluded) on the order of twice what is currently defined as debt.
The Kotlikoff–Sachs plan (1997) is the most forthright in addressing the solution, by
proposing that the existing unfunded pension liability should be paid out of national taxes
(originally, they proposed a national sales tax, but then modified this to a sort of value-added
tax).  The Moynihan plan goes part way towards such a solution, by allowing part of the
social security contributions to be diverted to a personal saving account, and making up part
of the lost social security revenues to pay benefits by raising the amount of taxes that are
subject to the payroll tax, thereby causing the unfunded liability to be shared a little bit more
equitably across income groups in our society (Pear, 1998, p. A26.).  But his plan, con-
strained as it is by his view of current political reality, does not go very far with this,
initially allocating only 1 percentage point of the 12.4 percentage points on payroll income
now levied for social security contributions.
While the US 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, all three factions,
recommended to Congress “partial advance funding for Social Security,” two of the three
factions proposed what appear to be only small changes in the advance funding of the
system.  The “Maintenance of Benefits” (MB) faction, while not being precise about how
much advance funding should be changed, describe their changes as modest.  The “Indi-
vidual Accounts” faction proposed that only 1.6% of covered payroll would be allocated to
be invested in the proposed individual accounts, the rest being used to continue the present
essentially pay-as-you-go system.  Currently, the social security system collects 12.4% of
the covered payroll.  Only the “Personal Security Account” faction proposed as much as a
halfway transition, with 5%, rather than just 1.6%, of covered payroll going to the accounts,
and, acknowledging the problem of paying existing obligations, with the existing obligations
borne by current young by the levying of a temporary 1.52% extra payroll tax over the next
72 years.4  The question of how the burden of the gift to the first generation should be borne
1995 dollars) and that these bonds would be fully repaid by the excess of tax revenues in the later
period,” Advisory Council, p. 21, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/adcouncil/findings.htm.
5When overlapping generations models are log-linearized, as in Bohn (1998b), then an analogous
simplification is also being made.  Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) provided a model similar to the
one here.
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by society is an important one, but not one that will be the subject of the discussion that
follows in this paper.  The question that remains is how the pay-as-you-go system can be
reformed to improve risk  sharing, to which we now turn.
3.  Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Many economists considering the theory of social security systems have stressed the issue
of purely intergenerational risk sharing, excluding international risk sharing: Fischer (1983),
Merton (1983), Gale (1990), Diamond (1997), Demange and Laroque (1997a,b), Bohn
(1998a,b).  This intergenerational risk management case is the obvious simple case to con-
sider, as there is in this theory only one government and only one social welfare function to
consider.  To set forth the risk management issues, I will take the unconventional step for
the overlapping generations model of assuming that each generation’s felicity (one-period
utility) is of the mean-variance form.  The mean-variance utility function is very well known
in financial discussions because of the simplicity of its implications for optimal portfolios,
and I want to use it here to facilitate the discussion.5  As I have set it up here for simplicity,
there is no concavity for riskless intergenerational transfers, i.e., there is no preference for
riskless consumption smoothing through time.  The model will be used only for con-
sideration of risk management.
As in the preceding section, the two-period overlapping generations model has no
population growth (so that all generations have the same number of people), no technical
progress, and the intertemporal discount rate is zero.  Moreover, I will assume initially that
all individuals who are alive will behave in a rational manner, that the only barrier to
optimization is not being born.  The utility function of individual j,  is given by:
(1)Uj ' uyj % uoj
where u denotes felicity, y denotes young and o denotes old.  The  mean-variance felicity
function, the component of the utility function for each generation, is:
(2)uij ' c̄i j &
j
2
var(cij), i ' y,o.
6Very roughly, we might consider uncertainty about time of death as a sort of income shock.  More
satisfactory discussions of this uncertainty are in Storesletten et al. (1998) and in Demange and
Laroque (1997a,b).
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where cij is consumption of the jth individual of age i, j is the risk aversion parameter for
the individual, a bar over a variable is its expectation and var denotes variance.
Management of Exogenous Income Risks
Let us first assume, as the simplest first case, that the jth individual earns exogenously
determined random income yyj when young, and yoj when old.  By exogenous, I mean that
the model will not represent any decisions that the individual can make that might change
these incomes.  Both of these incomes are initially uncertain, from the standpoint of time
t =–4, and as time passes, with each succeeding generation, the uncertainty about the income
of any particular generation is gradually resolved, so that eventually each generation knows
its income in the time period in which it is earned.6  Let us also assume that all people of the
same age have identical risk aversions and incomes, depending only on their age, so that we
can drop the j subscript for now.  Without government intervention each generation
consumes its own income, cy = yy and co = yo.  Without government help there can be no risk
sharing because it is not possible to trade with the young before they are born, and by the
time they are born all uncertainty about the period’s income has been resolved.  This fact
creates a role for government intervention in the markets.  There is of course some potential
role for partial risk sharing between generations without government intervention, if for
example we assumed that some of the risks about income when old were not revealed until
after the young adults can make risk managing deals.  But such opportunities for inter-
generational risk sharing will certainly be limited, and especially since macro markets
directly designed for such risk sharing do not yet exist.
The optimal strategy for the government for risk management, from the viewpoint of
t = –4, is to pool the incomes of the young and old and divide the incomes according to the
coefficients of risk aversion.  The government chooses the fraction  of i come uncertainty











Achieving this pooling of incomes means transferring (1 – ) of the young’s income to the
old, and  times the old’s income to the young, and possibly transferring a fixed real amount
between the generations also, not determined in this model.  After these transfers are made,
all individuals’ incomes (and consumptions) will be perfectly correlated with national
income, and thus with each other’s income and consumption, in accordance with the
optimality conditions shown in Breedon (1979).  Of course, in practice, we would not expect
to see any social insurance system to go to the extreme of such complete pooling of incomes.
Part of the difficulty faced by designers of government social security in managing
intergenerational risk sharing is that strategies like the above to further risk management will
also tend to carry with them effects on the preexisting distribution of income.  The govern-
ment has no sure way of knowing which people face more uncertainty about income, and
which individuals face higher expected value of income.  People who might know that their
income has a high expected value and low variance may have lowered expected utility,
conditional on this knowledge, relative to others, by an income-pooling scheme like that
described above.  It is not possible to create a social insurance system that does not have
such effects on the pre-existing distribution of income since the government does not have
the knowledge to prevent such effects.  A government-imposed risk-sharing system is
necessarily a blunt tool to deal with individual risks.
Note that this system of transfers does not need to entail any expected creation of an
unfunded pension liability and there are no “transition costs” to adopting it.  If, however,
adoption of the system of transfers is delayed until some of the information about the
original income uncertainty is resolved, then the transfer will no longer be a pure risk
management device that all parties would rationally agree to, but would be in part a
confiscation of existing wealth.
The personal income tax system, the corporate profits tax system, and social safety net
that are already in place provide some of this intergenerational risk sharing, as well as
intragenerational risk sharing.  If the investments do well for the old, then there will be more
tax revenue, from both the personal income taxes and the corporate profits taxes, which will
enable the government to allow the young to enjoy greater services or lower taxes.  If the
investments turn out badly, then both the young and old will suffer, the suffering of the old
will be mitigated via the lower taxes and social safety net, while the young will suffer from
lower government tax receipts creating either higher taxes for the young or lower gov-
ernment services.
One might say that part of the reason that we base individual taxes on income, rather
7Since people are not born only once a generation as in the overlapping generations model, but are
born fairly evenly over the years, the wage index used at time of retirement does cause benefits to
respond somewhat to younger generations’ income, but the wage index averages over young and old
workers’ incomes and no further adjustments tied to wage indexes are made after retirement.
12
than impose a lump-sum tax on everyone, is for just such risk management purposes, not
only intergenerationally, but also intragenerationally.  Thinking ahead to those who are not
yet born, the tax and social safety net system that we have may be regarded as a risk-
management device against the risk of being born with little ability or in a socially dis-
advantaged position.  While we are accustomed to describing progressive income tax
systems as motivated by a sense of justice in society, this sense of justice may be given a
Rawlsian interpretation, as here, and a system of justice becomes a system of risk manage-
ment (Rawls, 1970).
The amount of redistribution, here determined by , would perhaps be chosen differ-
ently for intergenerational risk management than for intragenerational risk management for
the young.  One reason why we may need an old age security system, and not just an income
tax and social safety net system that treats the elderly no differently than the young, is that
we may feel that risk aversion is higher for the elderly.  This higher risk aversion of the
elderly may be a result of different circumstances of the elderly rather than different tastes;
for example the very elderly will have much greater difficulty living as street people or
beggars.  There is also some experimental evidence indicating that the elderly are more risk
averse, see Barsky et al. (1997).  Rather than model such circumstances formally, we merely
represent their circumstances as a different risk aversion.  If we make such a representation
of their utility, we will wish to provide more income security to the retired people than we
do to society at large, and this then is a justification for old age insurance as apart from
general social insurance.  The same notion that utility is effectively age related could also
be used to justify other proposals for age-related transfers for remedying income inequality,
such as the proposed government transfers to the very young of Haveman (1988) and
Ackerman and Alstott (1997), motivated by the observation that very young people have
important opportunities that could give them a head start in life.
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of this model, the social security system that we have
in the US does not do this risk management even approximately right.  The real benefits that
are paid to retired persons are indexed to their own lifetime income before they were retired,
the PIA formula basing their benefit on the average value of 35 years of their social security
income adjusted to the present by a wage index, and the real buying power of this income
is preserved over the span of their retirement by indexation to the consumer price index.
From a risk-management viewpoint, the benefits are tied to the wrong generation’s income.7
8Some people do this.  See, for example, Secure Future Food and Supplies, 
http: //www.securefuture.com/.
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Choice of Risky versus Riskless Investments
The analysis above led us to a simple pay-as-you-go social security system that differs
essentially from the one we have in the US today only in the benefits payout formula.  But
the model that led to that conclusion assumed away the choice of physical investments.
Since much of the discussion of design of social security systems presumes that there is
underinvestment in risky assets like shares in corporations, let us now turn to a simple model
that stresses this choice.
Suppose there is a single risky real investment opportunity (stocks, say) that each
generation can purchase when young, and that any quantity of this investment can be
purchased.  There is also a riskless investment (stored commodities, say) with a lower ex-
pected return.  The two investment choices represent different investments for the nation in
physical capital.  As a caricature, we might say that investing in risky high-technology
stocks might mean investing in companies that manufacture computers and software, while
investing in stored commodities might mean placing barrels of nitrogen-packed dried food
in the basement.8
In this model, each generation faces a choice between risky and riskless investments
to provide income when they are later retired.  They can make the risky investment in as
much quantity as they want, and every real dollar invested in the risky project, at the
expense of an investment in the riskless project yields an expected increment in income next
period (when they are old and retired) µ, where µ is an excess income, relative to the
expected increment in retirement income they could obtain from investing the same dollar
in the low-yielding riskless investment.  Call  the standard deviation of the income, per
dollar invested, in the risky investment project.  We assume that the investment only has an
impact for the one generation, so that there are no further repercussions of such an invest-
ment.  At this point, let us disregard differences across individuals in risk aversion, and drop
subscripts from .
In the absence of any government intervention, and assuming that the income from the
investment is uncorrelated with the other income that people earn, then each individual in
each young generation will maximize:










This is the individual optimum but it is clearly not the social optimum since it fails to take
into account the potential risk sharing with the young.
If a benevolent social-planner government were to take charge of the investment and
allocation process, the planner would then optimally make the investment with consideration
of the entire income, of young and old combined, and then, since the utility function is
symmetric between the two generations, split the income equally between the two gen-












The government would make x twice as large as would have occurred if the decision had
been left to the market.  The utility of both generations would be increased as a result of the
government intervention.  Only the government can achieve  this, and individuals cannot do
this on their own, since the risk-sharing contract between young and old cannot be created
privately.  The next generation’s young are not born yet or are not yet of age yet to sign such
a risk-sharing contract when this generation’s young must make the investment.  We have
what appears to be an air-tight case for government intervention to increase the amount of
investment in our society.
If the government forces people to contribute to the social security system and invests
the proceeds in a trust fund of risky stocks it would be, to some extent, taking command of
the x described above, and pushing it to a higher level than it would have had if people were
left to their own devices.  (I say only to some extent, since people who already own more
in stocks than the government invests could offset the effect of the government and invest
less in stocks on their own, as Bohn (1998a) stresses, but in practice this effect is likely to
be limited as most people own little stocks.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) find that
pension wealth does not effectively displace other saving.)  Thus, this simple model appears
9The existing income tax system would have similar incentive effects for investment, by allowing risk
sharing.  The personal and corporate income tax systems tend to have negative incentive effects on
the level of saving, and the corporate income tax system has a negative incentive effect on corporate
versus noncorporate investment.  Presumably these effects are of little relevance from the standpoint
of a mandatory social security system.  The incentive effect of these taxes on high-expected-value
high-risk corporate investments versus alternative corporate investments is still to encourage the risky
investments.
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to justify the government’s building up a larger social security trust fund invested in stocks.
In this simple model, however, the government does not need to take command of x.  All
it need do to achieve the same effect is put in place a pay-as-you-go social security system
that subtracts from the social security benefit paid from the young to the old half of the
excess income, above income from the riskless investment, from the risky investments.  Any
income in excess of the amount they would earn from only riskless income would be taxed
at 50% (under the assumption we have made that all people have the same risk aversion and
there are the same number of persons in each generation), and any income short of the
amount they would earn from only the riskless investment would be made up at 50%.  Since
the model assumes that all living people optimize, then since people know when young that
such a social security plan is in place, they will, in deciding the amount x to invest when
they are young, face exactly the same maximization problem that the government faced just
above, and so they will choose the same x, and the outcome will be the same as if the
government had taken command of the investment process.  In effect, all that this model
suggests that need be done is to put in place an appropriately means-tested pay-as-you-go
risk-sharing social security system.9  (I shall mention some cautions about this conclusion
in the penultimate section of this paper.)
Allowing for Correlation with Other Income
An important factor that was assumed away in the above simple analysis is a possible
correlation  between the uncertain intergenerational risky investment outcome and the
income yy of the new young generation at the time that the investment income is realized.
For a social planner who will choose the optimal investment and share the proceeds equally
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where y is the standard deviation of the income of the younger generation at the time the
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Note that if  is positive, the socially optimal investment  will be less than was derived
above.  Moreover, it is even possible that the socially optimal investment could be less than
the amount that would be produced without any intergenerational risk sharing.  Thus,
consideration of intergenerational risk sharing could mean that we are investing too much,
not too little, in risky investments.  One is tempted to say, though, that the assumption that
 is not too large seems reasonable, and so that the theory still suggests that the level of risky
investments that people will undertake without governmental incentives is below he social
optimum.  Unfortunately, to decide how much the government should invest in the risky
investment (or to derive the optimal risk-sharing arrangement that encourages the private
sector to do so) we need to know the relevant correlations and standard deviations.  These
are not so easily estimated.  The relevant correlation  is the correlation, over long, inter-
generational, time intervals, between returns on the next new major risky investments that
the country must make and the remaining components of national income.  Presumably,
these new major risky investments are of a kind that this country has not made before, since
incentives to push investments to higher levels have not been there before.  There is no
guarantee that we have any way to estimate this correlation with historical data. 
Fortunately, the government does not need to estimate the parameters in the above
expression if it wants to provide market incentives the optimal risk-sharing arrangement.
If all individuals alive are behaving rationally, then all that the government needs to do is
to split the risk between the generations, by deciding that the two generations alive at one
time will share the national income (equally in the stylized model). 
Of course, there are changes in the model that could be made that would destroy this
result.  For example, we could suppose that the risk aversion parameter for the old is differ-
ent than for the young, or that the utilities are not additively separable between generations.
Any justification for government involvement in making investment decisions would have
to hinge on such properties of the model, and in this sense once the government’s risk-
sharing initiatives are fulfilled, any justification for government investing in high-risk high-
return assets for social security is not so obvious as some advocates suggest. 
10Moral hazard did not arise in the previous section, where we assumed that all people in a generation
are identical and where the transfers made could be based on aggregates, rather than individual
incomes.  In practice, of course intergenerational risk sharing is not likely to be done entirely in terms
of generation aggregates.
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4.  Intragenerational Risk Sharing
Intragenerational risk sharing is the pooling of risks among individuals in a single gen-
eration.  Social security systems have important functions in such intragenerational pooling.
If a retired individual turns out, for reasons of bad investments or bad health or the like, to
have a low income in retirement, the system can help, even without any sharing of income
risks with people outside the generation of retired persons.  Two important issues must be
discussed about such intragenerational risk pooling:  the issue of moral hazard and the issue
of prior income inequality.
The moral hazard issue arises when we make benefits relate to individual income.10  If
we insure individual people’s income completely then they will have no incentive to work.
Even with partial insurance, there will be some drops in labor force participation, some
shifts to the informal sector, and some tendency for early retirement.  These consequences
of public risk management systems such as social security systems have proven to be very
important in many countries, see James (1997), World Bank (1994).  We shall see that there
is a justification for a special social security program pooling risks among the old, and this
will not optimally be just a social welfare system that disregards age if moral hazard differs
between young and old, or if risk aversions differ between young and old, or if variances of
income differ between young and old.
 Let us consider a very simple model that illustrates risk management with moral hazard.
Suppose that individual j in this generation has an income variance, conditional on
information available before birth, equal to , where i is the standard deviation of income
2
i
in the ith period of life, i = y when young and i = o when old, and that each individual’s
income is uncorrelated with all other individuals’ incomes.  Suppose that there are very
many people, and so there is virtually no aggregate income variance (let us say for this
example that there is none at all).  Incomes are unrelated across ages, young and old, and so
we can consider the problem separately for the two ages.  The government must choose how
much of income to pool.  It selects a parameter i between zero and one, pools the fraction
i of all incomes at a time among people in this generation, and shares this pooled income
equally among all individuals.  The after- pooling income variance is .(1 & i)
2 2
i
Suppose now that there is an efficiency loss caused by the moral hazard  ai i where ai
is a parameter showing how much people in that age group are vulnerable to moral hazard.
Then, substituting into the above utility function for an individual, the increment to utility
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related to governmental risk sharing for an individual is: 





i , 0 < i < 1, i ' y,o
and the optimal fraction of income to share is found to be: 





, i ' y,o
The o may be higher than the y if the o is higher, since the old are more risk averse, if the
ao is lower, the old have less opportunities to shirk since they are less likely to be working,
and if i is higher, they may be more dependent on risky investments like stocks, and their
labor income is more uncertain because of uncertain health and ability to work.  Any of
these differences would justify a higher  for the old, and this would make a justification for
a social security system that is different from the income-tax-social-safety-net system that
is not tied to age.
Prior income inequality is another issue that becomes difficult when thinking about
intragenerational risk management for social security.  The above model would imply that
the social security benefit received when old has nothing to do with income when young.
Indeed, in practice, our social security systems are part of the mechanisms that reduce
intragenerational income inequality, and this model would appear to recommend, if ao = 0,
carrying this leveling of retirement incomes to completion.  This elimination of income
inequality could be given a risk- management interpretation, and a model of optimal risk
management might lead us to the conclusion that prior income inequality should be elim-
inated by social security.  But in fact, the social security system has no mandate to eliminate
such inequality.
We will have to assume that the extent to which the social security system redistributes
income between existing rich and poor is given exogenously.  In practice, this means that
the benefits paid on social security must be related in part to income while young.  In the
formula given in the conclusion below, benefits therefore depend on income when young,
as does the present system, although the dependence will be of such a form that it makes it
possible for people whose income is at a certain level relative to the average to share old-
income risk among themselves and with others at the same level, and does not guarantee to
anyone a repeat of their young income in old age.
A potential problem with the intrageneratioal risk sharing justification for a program
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that treats the elderly differently from the young is that it might appear that individuals can
do the risk sharing for their old age themselves without any government help.  To the extent
that elderly people are living off of investments, then they can completely pool their risks
just by all investing in a fully diversified portfolio. 
In fact, there are many practical limitations to the ability of the elderly to diversify their
income by themselves, and so indeed there does remain a role for the government in
providing intragenerational risk sharing specially designed for the elderly.  First of all, the
risks may become realized before they are old, and before they are even capable of making
risk management arrangements for themselves.  The problem that one cannot make contracts
when one is unborn can arise here too, just as it did for intergenerational risk management.
Second, many people of retirement age do still work, and suffer great variability in their
retirement income as their health and abilities become more uncertain.  Private insurance
for general individual income risk does not exist, presumably because of the selection bias
problem, the bad risks tend to come to the companies that might offer it.  Disability insur-
ance does function on a private basis, since the insurance covers only income losses from
verifiable causes, and since medical exams can be used to exclude certain bad risks.  Even
so selection problems do inhibit disability insurance and cause their premiums to be high
enough that few people buy it on their own, certainly few of the elderly.  Third, many people
just do not have the foresight to diversify their portfolios wisely or take out disability
insurance policies.
5.  International Risk Sharing
Even though there is not a global government that would share the risks of one generation
of the world with another, the basic social security risk management problem is still an
international one.  Indeed, corporate investments on which some investment of trust funds
is based are inherently, and increasingly, international.  Moreover, if the public is someday
able to trade in claims on national incomes with macro markets, as I have argued they
should, then people will naturally be hedging their own national income risks and investing
in other national incomes. 
To gain some sense of the potential importance of international risk sharing, I have done
some calculations that may give some indication of the relative magnitude of the inter-
generational variance when compared with the international variance of national incomes
(as proxied for by gross domestic products).  I used the Penn World Table data on
populations (POP) and real per capita gross domestic products (RGDPCH), from the
National Bureau of Economic Research web site, for the 51 countries for which there was
complete data, data for every year from 1950 to 1992.  The combined gross domestic
11All these estimated standard deviations are probably biased downwards as measures of the actual
standard deviation, since in computing the variance the denominator was the usual one, the number
of observations years (33 or 23) minus one, while, because of the overlap of the time intervals, there
were less than these numbers of independent observations.  The bias should not affect the comparisons
between country and world standard deviations.
20
products of these 51 countries averaged, over the 43 years, 78% of the total gross domestic
product (GDP) of all 151 countries.  Most of the countries for which data were incomplete
were small countries.  For the 51 countries, the average, over all 51 countries, moving
standard deviation of the 10-year percentage change in real per capita GDP was 18.0%, and
the 20-year percentage change in real per capita GDP was 25.2%.  These numbers give
some clue as to the variability of intergenerational income variability within a country.  In
contrast, the standard deviation of the 10-year change in world per capita real gdp (taking
these 51 countries as the world) is only 9.5%, and the standard deviation of the 20-year
change in world per capita GDP (again for these 51 countries) is 15.6%.11  From these
numbers, it appears that the standard deviation of the world change in real per capita GDP
over long time intervals is about half that of the within-country change, and so the variance
would be about a quarter as large.  This would suggest that perhaps most of the utility gain
that might be achieved by intergenerational risk sharing could be achieved instead by
international risk sharing. 
While these numbers are suggestive, it has to be admitted that the data are not available
to get precise estimates of the extent of within-country intergenerational or world inter-
generational income variance.  At the very least, these data are consistent with the plausible
notion that international risk sharing is on the same order of magnitude importance as the
within-country intergenerational risk sharing.
An International Overlapping Generations Model
What should the government do to promote optimal risk sharing internationally?  Let us
consider an overlapping generations model of international diversification of risks, a model
that is in its essential elements a variation on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in
finance, but where the highlighted problem is the government’s role in dealing with the
problem that certain agents, the young, are incapable of choosing portfolios before they are
born or mature.  We will see that, in one model, if we can assume that each generation will
hedge optimally on international markets when young its income when old, then all the
government need do is create a system to make transfers between the two generations of
their own country based on their after-international-hedging incomes. 
Let us adapt the two-period overlapping generations model used above for J countries,
with all individuals identical within each country.  For this example, I will concentrate here
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on uncertainty about income when old, and assume that random income is independent
across generations.  The model will set the uncertainty about income when young to zero
(this simplification is not essential to the basic results).  I will also assume initially that all
uncertainty, represented by the J × J variance matrix of old income conditional on
information when young o, is completely resolved for everyone between the time when
they are young and the time when old.
We suppose that individuals in country j are able effectively to sell off their income
when old for a price, pj.  Call the J × 1 column vector of shares of an individual in country
j in per capita income of each other country qj, and call yyj income while young and yoj
income while old, before individuals’ hedging, and yo the J element column vector whose
jth element is yoj.  Then felicity when old of an individual in country j from the standpoint
of their youth is given by: 
(13)uoj ' ȳo j % qjN(ȳo & p) &
j
2
( o jj % 2qj o.j % qjN o qj )
Each individual maximizes this utility while young, purchasing risk-management contracts
(shares) by dealing with the young of other countries, and so differentiates this expression
with respect to qj and sets the result to zero.  We find that the demand is given by:
(14)qj '
&1
o (ȳo & p)/ j & ej
where ej is an elementary vector, a J-element column vector which is zero except in the j
place, where it is 1.  Assembling these vectors into a J × J matrix Q, we have:
(15) Q ' &1o (ȳo & p) N
&1 & I
where  is a J element column vector of ones and  is a J × J diagonal matrix with j as the
jth diagonal element.
Market equilibrium requires (assuming for simplicity that all countries have the same
population) that Q  = 0 and so, solving for price, we find that the equilibrium price is: 
(16)p ' ȳo & o ( N
&1 )&1
Substituting this expression for p into the equation for Q, we find that Q = –M where M is
the idempotent matrix I – ( N –1 )–1 N –1.  Then, after-hedging income (consumption) co is
given by , where C = I – M.  It follows that the post-co ' CNyo %MNȳo&MN ( N
&1 )&1
hedging variance of consumption is CN oC and the post-hedging mean of income is
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.  Finally, the maximized utility of the representative individual inȳo & MN o ( N
&1 )&1
country j is:
(17)Uj ' yyj % ȳo j & M. jN o ( N
&1 )&1 & j
2
C. jN oC. j
This utility level is not at the highest level attainable since risk sharing with the (unborn)
younger generation was not possible.  Suppose the government und r akes such risk sharing
by arranging a pay-as-you-go social security system that takes an amount  from thebjNyo
young and gives it to the currently old.  Moreover, suppose the government undertakes
international risk sharing by purchasing an amount qj of claims on national incomes on
behalf of the older generation.  The combined utilities of the older and younger generations,
consistent with the government budget constraint, is:
(18)
Ucj ' yyj & 2
bjN obj%ȳo j % qjN(ȳo & p)
&
2
( oj j % 2(qjN % bjN) o . j % (qjN % bjN) o(qj % bj )).
Maximizing this utility with regard both to bj and qj, we find that the optimal values are: 
(19)bj ' &
&1





o (ȳo & p)/ j & ej.
We see, then, the optimal pay-as-you-go social security payment from young to old has a
rather complicated form:  it depends on the variance matrix of world national incomes, on
the expected incomes in all countries, and on the price of claims on these incomes.
Even though the optimal pay-as-you-go social security system has this complicated
form, in equilibrium, if all countries are optimizing in  this manner, we can substitute out
for price and derive a simpler expression for the optimal pay-as-you-go social security
system.  If all countries make these arrangements, then the equilibrium price is:




and Q = –M as before.  It follows in this equilibrium that each person’s income is perfectly
correlated with world income, and scaled by the inverse of the risk aversion parameter for
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that country.  In contrast to the case above where all risk management is handled by
individuals, so that only older-generation income moves with world income, in this example
government intervention is able make both young and old incomes correlate perfectly with
world income.
The government intervention in the markets produces a higher level of  mean-variance
utility for everyone.  But what was the essential element of this government intervention?
Could the government have achieved the same utility in a simpler way?  The answer in this
example is, if everyone is investing optimally, yes.  The simpler strategy to achieve the same
total welfare is for the government merely to make the transfer of  from the young tobjNyo
the old, without itself taking any part in the shares of foreign country risks, so long as there
are private markets that allow old individuals to buy and sell shares in incomes.  If the
government announces a rule that the transfer will be made from young to old according to
this rule, then the government’s social security rule will create an incentive for people, when
young, to hedge the risky income after government transfers from the young to the old.
Then the optimization problem for the young has the same solution for qj as above.  Thus,
this model offers a justification for a government creating a pay-as-you-go social security
system whose intergenerational transfers are tied to world income, but does not justify any
governmental investment or risk management itself.
If everyone is optimizing, the transfer rule that the government would follow is very
simple.  Substituting into equation (21) for price given by equation (19), we find that the
vector bj has the form: 
(22)bj ' &
( N( &1 )&1
2 j
and in the case where all risk aversions are the same, this means just that bj = – /(2J), for
example.  The government merely transfers half of its share of world income from old to
young (in exchange for a fixed real amount) without regard for the covariance matrix  or
the price vector p.  Thus, this rule is very simple, but only under the assumption that all
prices are set optimally, and all countries are following this optimal rule.  There is an
analogous result in the CAPM that, if everyone else is behaving optimally, investors need
only hold the market portfolio and the riskless asset, and there too the assumption that others
are behaving optimally is required.
There is also another governmental transfer rule that is even simpler, that allows the
government to achieve the optimal sharing of risks for its citizens even without the
assumption that all countries are optimizing, relying instead only on the assumption that its
own citizens are behaving optimally.  The government need only specify that a fraction (a
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half in this model since there are as many old as young and since old and young here have
the same risk aversion) of after-hedging income of the old is transferred to the young




qjN(ȳo & p) & 8
( oj j % 2qjN o . j % qjN oqj)
One finds that the quantity vector qj that maximizes this expression is the same as (20).
Moreover, if all countries do this, then we achieve the same perfect world sharing of
income.  Thus, there is no need for governments to undertake any involvement in world risk
management.  It is critical to note that for this method of achieving optimal risk management
to work, the social security benefit must be tied to after-hedging income, i.e., it must be
means-tested using all income including investments income.
 While this skeletal model implies no government actions to hedge internationally, there
are variations on this theme that would justify it.  As mentioned above, the result that no
government investment in hedging vehicles is needed after the risk sharing is established
could be overturned by changing the model so that risk aversions are different between
young and old or by dropping the assumption of additively separable utility.  Also, if
information about incomes when old is revealed two periods earlier, even before the old
were born, then there is no chance for these people to do any hedging of these risks before
they are born.  In this case, for true optimality, the government would have to undertake
international hedging investments for people before they were born.
6.  Limitations on the Ability to Manage Risks
In several places above it was assumed that individuals would manage their income risks by
taking the appropriate hedging or investment positions in financial markets, and this
assumption simplifies the role of the government in risk sharing.  I have already alluded to
the fact that people’s ability to do this is imperfect.  Let us now consider in more detail two
reasons why their ability to hedge their risks is imperfect, and why there might thus be a
government role in investing and hedging.  The two reasons are that appropriate hedging
markets do not exist, and that most people are not now prepared, psychologically or
intellectually, to do such hedging anyway. 
Nonexistence of Appropriate Markets
The macro markets defined above, the markets for claims on major income aggregates such
as national incomes, do not exist, yet.  Any effort to use existing securities markets to hedge
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lifetime income risks must necessarily rely on some assumed correlation between the returns
on these securities and the returns on claims on individual incomes. 
Baxter and Jermann (1996) argue that for the United States the correlation between
returns on securities and innovations in the present value of labor income is very high.  Part
of their argument is based on a theoretical presumption that a Cobb–Douglas production
function, competitive factor markets is reasonable, and a multiplicative random technology
shock term.  With these assumptions, despite any movements in the random technology
shock term, the labor- and capital-share in incomes are constant, and hence total labor
income and total capital income must be perfectly correlated.  They conclude that returns
to capital and labor must also be perfectly correlated.  This conclusion actually requires an
assumption not stated in their paper, that there is no randomness to the rate of creation or
economic depreciation of either capital or labor, for otherwise there would be variations in
the return between existing capital or labor, even though the total flows to all capital and all
labor are perfectly correlated.  For intergenerational purposes, depreciation of existing
capital ought to be very important: by most assumptions most capital depreciates to nothing
over decades.
Bohn (1998a,b) adopts for his basic model the Baxter–Jermann production function with
a multiplicative technology term whose log is a random walk, and assumes no stochastic
depreciation, for his model of the effects of the social security system.  Thus, he has built
into his model the perfect correlation between returns to human and physical capital.  In
Bohn (1998a) he considers extensions of the model including stochastic depreciation which
he calls random salvage value for capital, which breaks down this perfect correlation.  With
such models, the public’s ability to manage risks (without the macro markets I have
described above) is reduced.
Baxter and Jermann (1997) use data on labor income and capital income, and estimate
a vector autoregressive model for the two for four countries, U.S., UK, Germany and Japan.
They conclude that innovations in the present value of capital income are highly positively
correlated with innovations in the present value of labor income, and therefore that claims
on existing capital can be used quite effectively to hedge labor income risk.  They reach the
conclusion that people should be very short the stock markets of their own countries in order
to hedge their own country risk.
While the conclusion that people should be short their own country’s stock market
appears very plausible, and likely right, it appears that they may be overestimating the
correlation between income returns and stock market returns.  The first problem is their
assumption that returns to existing capital and labor can be inferred accurately using data
on aggregate flows to capital and labor.  It may be better to use stock market returns data to
learn about returns to investing in existing stocks.  Second, the authors chose a cointegrated
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model for log labor and capital income, with cointegrating vector equal to [–1, 1].  Thus,
they are embodying the assumption of a constant labor share. 
Bottazzi, Pesenti and Van Wincoop (1996) showed data on capital shares of a number
of countries, and find that capital share was not as stable in many of these as it was in the
Baxter and Jermann data.  They also did an analysis using stock market returns data, and
obtained a negative correlation between returns in US financial markets and innovations in
national income present values.
While all of the evidence on the adequacy of existing markets to permit hedging national
income risks is not yet in, I would say that it appears quite risky to base a national income
hedging strategy solely on existing markets.  It is thus difficult, in the absence of macro
markets, for anyone to do the effective international hedging of income risks.  At this time
of reform of social security systems around the world, there may be a great opportunity for
governments to innovate and create the macro markets, as for example by issuing govern-
ment bonds indexed to their own national income, thereby making possible some of the
international hedging that is optimal for international risk management.
Failures of Individuals to Manage Risks
The models of risk management described above mostly presumed that people are evaluating
risks optimally.  The appeal of such models is that they allow us to understand, in simple
direct terms, the nature of incentives provided by the present institutions and the outcomes
if people respond as they should to these incentives.  But, the notion that people will manage
risks optimally may be excessively academic.  It does not appear that people today are think-
ing in terms that are well captured by these models, or that they are optimizing overall risk
in any sense that is nearly optimal.
The above analysis, and the assumption that people are well described as optimizing in
this manner, would have to imply that people are thinking about such things as the correla-
tion between labor income and investment returns.  One model above used the parameter 
which was the correlation between investment income and the next generation’s labor
income, another model used the covariance matrix o of incomes of countries around the
world.
I did a Nexis search of newspapers and magazines in English, searching on the word
“correlation” and “mutual fund,” to try to find how often mutual funds say anything about
the correlation of their returns to anything resembling income aggregates.  The search
produced many hits with mutual fund and correlation in the same story, but not a single one
with the correlation between the mutual fund returns and any proxy for aggregate national
income.
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People seem to be largely unaware of the importance of using financial markets to hedge
existing income risks.  Part of the reason that they may be so unaware of this possibility is
just that there are now no markets for long-term claims on income aggregates or labor
income, and so the returns in these markets or the changes in the present value of these
incomes are not even observed.  Since these returns are unobserved, they are less salient,
less easily perceived by the general public, and hence less likely to be hedged.
Euler equation models have long been known to imply that people apparently should
have been investing more in stocks over the last century than they in fact have, see
Grossman and Shiller (1981).  This problem has sometimes been referred to as “the equity
premium puzzle,” following an article by Mehra and Prescott (1985) that stressed it.
The public seems to have widespread misconceptions about the risk inherent in long-
term bonds.  The public has tended to view these as safe investments, in terms of their
volatility, while stocks are risky.  But, as shown by Siegel (1998), U.S. long-term bonds
have actually been riskier, in terms of their real variance, than U.S. stocks.
The public seems often to use naive rules of thumb for portfolio allocation across broad
aggregates, and this behavior is a problem for models that presume proper public risk
management.  This is analogous to a problem with optimizing models of the saving decision;
people do not appear to be proper life cycle savers (see, for example, Shefrin and Thaler,
1988; Carroll and Summers, 1991).  Individual differences in savings propensities appear
to result in large variation in wealth at retirement, and roughly half of people in the middle
income deciles have virtually no personal assets at all as they approach retirement, Venti
and Wise (1997).  Many retired people suddenly contract their consumption at the point of
retirement, as if the effects of the retirement were a sudden surprise to them, even though
they should have seen it coming, Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (1997).  At the very
least, a social security system must provide insurance against the consequences of making
such egregious errors in the risk management or saving decisions.
7. Summary and Relation to Various Social Security
Reform Proposals
We have seen some models that imply that the optimal government intervention for optimal
intergenerational, intragenerational and international risk sharing, and the optimal level of
investment in risky investment projects, would amount to no more than a sort of pay-as-you-
go social security system indexed to incomes of the young and old.  These models suggest
that there is no need for the government to mandate the building of a large trust fund of
investable assets.  There are also political obstacles and agency problems with the govern-
ment’s taking on the responsibility for investments or for international hedging positions,
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and so there is something naturally attractive about confining a social security system to its
essential social insurance function, leaving out any government mandates that would direct
investments.
Let us consider idealized social security contributions and benefits formulas that the
models above suggest will promote better intergenerational, intragenerational and inter-
national risk sharing, but that do not involve government participation in investing.  (We
may suppose that these formulas coexist with other programs encouraging individual saving
and investment, that are not considered here.)  These formulas will involve exchanges of
income risk between the young and old, thereby reducing total risk for both.  These formulas
can be viewed as benchmarks against which to judge risk management in the alternative
proposals for reform of the system, though, of course, they cannot be used to judge other
objectives (such as encouraging savings) of these proposals.  The social security contribu-
tions and benefits formulas are:








where contributionyj is the contribution made by the jth working (young) person in the
country and benefitoj is the benefit to the jth retired (old) person in the country.  The variable
yyj is the jth young individual’s after-tax and after-hedging income from sources other than
social security, yy is per capita income of the young in the country after-tax and after-
hedging (the average over j of yyj), yoj is the income of the jth old (retired) person after taxes
and after-hedging, and yo is the per capita income of old people in the country after-tax and
after-hedging (the average over j of yoj).  The function of income that the currently old had
when they were young, last period, as a fraction of per capita income of the young last
period, (yyj–1/yy–1), N > 0, is included to make the benefits formula depend on prior income,
just as social security systems do today.  As discussed above, I regard it as a constraint
imposed on designers of social security that benefits must depend on contributions.
Moreover, the function  may also be motivated as providing a scaling to the benefit, on the
assumption that people with higher income last period have higher expected income and
variance of income this period.  The  function can also be used to make the benefits
formula progressive, as it is in the US today.  Let us suppose that this is a linear function
such that the average over j of (yyj–1/yy–1) is a given constant .  (The average of yyj–1/yy–1¯
is one by construction.)  Thus, the total benefits paid to all retirees is unaffected by the
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aggregate level of income of the young last period.  All parameters, a, b, c and  are strictly¯
greater than zero.
The parameters can be set so that benefits equal contributions so the system is pay-as-
you-go just as our present system, though it differs from the present system in that it is a
risk-sharing system.  This equality is achieved by making a =  and b = c.  If we modify the¯
overlapping generations model so that there are not the same number of retired people as
working people, we will have instead an =  and bn = c where n is the number of young¯
working people per retired person (inverse of the dependency ratio), so that n is a little
below 5 in the US today.  (We would expect n to decline in most countries in coming
decades, see World Bank (1994), Tables A.1 p. 343 and A.2, p. 349.)
Let us consider a rough example of the parameters of these benefits and contributions
formulas that would represent a modest adjustment of the social security system in place in
the United States today, a step in the right direction.  These values are not intended as a
serious proposal, but just an indication of what might be done, and what might even have
some chance of political support.  Let us set a = 0.25 and b = 0.10, so that if yo = yy the tax
rate on income of the young is 0.15, or not much more than the 12.4% paid by employee and
employer together today.  With these parameter values, however, the tax rate rises and falls
reflecting relative incomes of the young and old, and offering a little income risk sharing to
both of them.  Assuming a steady state value for n, the number of old per retired, of 3, then
we would make  equal 0.75 and c equal 0.30.  The average retiree with no other income¯
would then receive 75% of the average income of the young, but would, if there is other
income, give up 30% of that income.  If we set (yyj–1/yy–1) equal to 0.375 + 0.375yyj–1/yy–1
then we would have a progressive system, which guarantees for someone with no income
at all, none when young and none from non-Social-Security sources when old, a retirement
income of 37.5% of the average income of young people.
With these values for the benefits formula, retired persons give up 30% of their income
from sources other than social security.  This percent is not far from the present formula in
the U.S., where workers aged 65–69 who began collecting Social Security benefits at age
65 see their benefits cut by one third of their salary and wages above the Social Security
“cap” of $14,500.  However, the above formulas involve no cap, the above formulas apply
to all income, not just salary and wage income, and the benefits reduction is not limited to
people under 70.  It is important that the formulas apply to all income and all retired persons,
since their purpose is sharing of income risks, including everyone’s income and including
the risks to non-labor income. 
The risk-sharing function served by the benefits formula’s negative relation to all retired
persons’ total income is fundamental to the functioning of social security as insurance.
Unfortunately, in today’s controversy over the Social Security cap in the US, risk sharing
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appears almost never to be mentioned, and the debate over the cap seems to be almost
entirely over questions of fairness, disincentives to work and the work ethic, and on the
effects on the government budget.
I have left out of these functions the limit on income that is subject to the social security
tax in the present US social security system.  In the present system, contributions are made
as a fraction of income only up to a certain limit, $65,400 in 1997.  I left the limit out of the
idealized formulas, since I see no reason not to extend the risk sharing to more wealthy
people, but of course the formulas could be altered to incorporate these thresholds.
Realistically, if we are politically constrained to only modest adjustments in the present
system, we would have to expect that the benefits and contributions formulas above would
apply only to incomes up to such limits.
I have also left out of the above formulas any discussion of the fact that n changes
through time, due to changing birth and death rates.  Recognizing these changes, we may
continue to use the existing trust fund to build up assets in times when there are many
young, and spent down in times when there are few young.
These benefits and contributions formulas may look unfamiliar and unlike what we
would expect of insurance premia and payments.  We are accustomed to thinking that true
insurance must guarantee a benefit whose value is fixed, and that the premium must be
fixed.  But, in fact, if the social security system is to function as true insurance, minimizing
the effects on people of risks by spreading these risks over many people, then it is essential
that the formulas have a form that swaps own income for a broader aggregate of income, as
accomplished by these formulas.  The concept that the best insurance program for the
elderly is one in which their benefits are fixed in real terms, since that entails no risks at all
for them is valid, in a sense, but this ignores the effects of the program on the nonelderly.
Proponents of fixed real benefits sometimes speak as if these fixed real benefits could be
provided at no expense to others, as if providing such benefits is just a matter of conceiving
the right program.  In fact, providing a fixed real income to the elderly is not free, and not
an efficient system from the standpoint of risk management.  The above formulas are
designed for better risk sharing, reducing the concentration of the risks on the young that the
present system entails.
These benefits and contributions formulas are very simple embodiments of some of the
principles revealed by the analysis above, but there are also more complicated formulas that
should also be considered.  Governments may want themselves to hedge some of the risks
that are revealed for their people before they are born, as described above.  This means that
governments may want to take long-term international hedging positions, and their hedging
would then naturally be reflected in the benefits and contributions formulas themselves.
Moreover, given the fact that many people, even after they are born, are still apparently
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incapable of doing hedging of any sort themselves, the government may want ideally to
undertake some international hedging for them, and reflect the result in the benefits
formulas.  The contributions and benefits formulas above could be changed so that the
young and old in the country are not swapping income with each other, but so that they are
both swapping income with the rest of the world, therefore directly promoting income risk
sharing with the rest of the world.  Note that in this case the contributions and benefits can
no longer be expected to equal each other, even approximately, since both contributors and
beneficiaries are now net receivers of world income, whose future values are uncertain.  The
social security administration would then have to take hedging positions in foreign markets
to make feasible their application of such formulas.  It would ideally issue bonds denom-
inated indexed to own-country national incomes and invest abroad, ideally in such bonds of
other countries.  The government adoption of such international risk sharing on behalf of
their citizens might possibly be more acceptable in some small less developed countries,
where the magnitude of the own-country risk is more severe, where the advantages of
issuance of government bonds tied to own-country national income would be more
prominent, and where the foolishness of investing solely in one’s own country would be
more obvious.
Another variation on these benefits and payouts formulas might also be suggested by
labor supply distortions considerations:  the dependence of the benefits and contributions
on incomes of the old or young might be split into two parts, the individual’s own income
and the income of the aggregate age cohort.  To the extent that benefits and contributions
are tied to the aggregate cohort income, rather than individual income, the labor market
distortions are diminished.  Moreover, the formulas could give different weight to labor and
capital income, reflecting the different distortionary taxation issues between the two.
Let us finally review how well the existing social security system in the U.S. and some
of the proposed alternative systems in this country live up to these benefits and contributions
formulas or their variations.  The issue is not whether they are in full accordance with the
risk sharing formulas, but how much they contribute toward such risk sharing, even approxi-
mately.
The existing US social security system is not in accordance with the above formulas for
any parameter values.  The existing social security system fulfills little of the intergenera-
tional risk sharing function, and by tying benefits to the old to the CPI index without regard
to the incomes of the young, it might make the intergenerational risk-management situation
even worse than it would be if there were no social security system.  It certainly does
nothing at all to promote international risk sharing, and the way benefits are calculated there
is no offset in contributions from the young if there is high hedging income received from
abroad by the old.  Since under present law contributions are more tied to incomes than are
12Of course, the Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance components of US Social Security
System provide additional intragenerational risk sharing.  Kotlikoff and Sachs point out that the
current Social Security System Old Age Insurance also generates new intragenerational risks, because
of the way benefits are affected by changes in family structure.
13Report of the 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security Volume I Findings and Recom-
mendations, page 8, http: //www.ssa.gov/policy/adcouncil/findings.htm\#overview.
14Op.cit., p. 14.
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benefits, the benefits formula is progressive, there is an intragenerational risk sharing
function.  However, since the social security contribution is cut off at relatively low income
levels, the intragenerational risk sharing is limited.12
The 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security was called primarily to propose how
to “fix” the US Social Security System, which appears to have meant that they should deal
primarily with the problem that the Social Security Trust Fund was projected to be ex-
hausted by the year 2029.  They were not asked to study whether the social security function
was well designed as an instrument of social insurance, and so it is not surprising that they
made virtually no attempt to think about theoretical risk-management issues.  It is also not
surprising that they did not come up with proposals that involved major new transfers among
people, which effective risk management would require.
The Council divided into three factions, but all factions agreed that the social security
benefits should not be means tested:13
Moreover, means-testing would send the wrong signal to young people and wage earners
generally.  The message would be “if you are a saver and build up income to supplement
social security, you will be penalized by having your Social Security benefits reduced.”  This
message is both unfair to those who work and save and creates the wrong incentives.
Apparently, the Council was aware of the distortionary effects of such means testing but
unaware of its risk-management advantages.
No faction of the Council proposed anything like the risk-sharing benefits formulas
described above; certainly none proposed that benefits to the elderly would have anything
to do with the incomes of the young.  Thus, there appears to be no intergenerational risk
sharing in any of these proposals.  All three factions proposed that some part of the Social
Security contributions would be invested in the stock market, and none of them addressed
the issue of sharing the risks of these investments intergenerationally.
The Maintenance of Benefits (MB) faction specified that it would “maintain the present
Social Security benefit and tax structure essentially as is,”14 without specifying explicitly
how this will be guaranteed to be feasible when part of the trust fund (about 40% according
to their plan) is invested in stocks and thus subject to market shocks.  Since they say that
theirs is a defined benefit plan, it is clear that they do not intend the elderly retired persons
15“We include in our proposal an increase in the contribution rate of 0.8% for the employee with
matching rate for the employer, to go into effect about 50 year from now.  This increase of a combined
1.6 percent of payroll may not be needed when the year 2045 is reached, but we build it into law now
so that it can be used if needed at that time to maintain a stable ratio between the trust funds and the
next year’s outgo ...,” see Robert M. Ball, et al., “Social Security for the 21st Century:  A Strategy to
Maintain Benefits and Strengthen America’s Family Protection Plan,”
http: //www.ssa.gov/policy/adcouncil/ball1.htm.
16Bohn (1998b) models the social security budget constraint in essentially these terms when analyzing
the effects of investing the Trust Fund in stocks.
17Some other plans do a little better on risk sharing than these plans do.  The Kotlikoff–Sachs plan
specifies that the social security contributions would be invested internationally.
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to bear any of this stock market risk.  There are also words in their statement that may be
interpreted as suggesting that in the event of a major stock market downturn, the young
would bear the full brunt of the loss.  While they show no clear awareness in their report of
the risk of such poor performance of the stock market, they did mention risks that might shift
social security out of actuarial balance, risks of changed life expectancies and of other costs.
For these risks, they make it clear that the contributions tax rate will be adjusted,15 and so
it would appear that they intend the stock market risk to be borne exclusively by the young
with the burden allocated among them with respect to their social security income.16
The other two factions of the Council, the Independent Accounts (IA) faction and the
Personal Security Account (PSA) faction both specified moving the social security system
in the direction of a defined contribution plan, wherein people would enjoy the returns on
the funds invested in their own accounts.  Their plans thus move in the direction of less
intragenerational risk sharing than the present system entails.  Beneficiaries will have less
money to live on if their own investments do badly. 
None of the three plans mentions international risk sharing, and in fact they occasionally
quote statistics on historical returns that do not even specify which country was used,
perhaps reflecting the longstanding popular assumption that the US is the only plausible
investment.17  If the IA or PSA investments are made substantially in the US stock markets,
not diversifying internationally, then beneficiaries will see some substantial risk to their
retirement incomes that is wholly inconsistent with the notion of social insurance and
effective risk management.
In evaluating any social security proposals, it must be borne in mind that any proposal
that has a serious chance of passing must be a sort of political compromise, politically
acceptable not only now but in the distant future.  There are many other factors to consider
beyond the risk management issues considered here, such as existing tax law distortions, the
need to promote savings, and the need to appeal to popular notions of fairness.  It is only
hoped that this paper will have helped promote discussion, by bringing up more clearly the
34
true insurance functions of social security, which has been confused and blurred in most
public discussions.
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